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MAJOR U.S. SUPREME COURT CIVIL RIGHTS AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DECISIONS:
JANUARY-JUNE 1989
by Samuel Rabinove*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Of all the civil rights issues which the United States Supreme
Court has grappled with in recent years, none has been as divisive as
employment discrimination and affirmative action. Hence, it is not
surprising that the Court has often failed to send clear signals to the
country as to the proper limits of affirmative action remedies in
employment discrimination cases. For example, in the leading case of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' decided in 1971, the Court ruled unanimously
that "[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed"2 in title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.' The Court in Griggs also ruled that job qualification
standards must be related to job performance 4 and placed on employers
the burden of proving, as an affirmative defense, that practices shown to
have a discriminatory or disparate impact on racial minorities are actually
justified by business necessity. 5 In Fumco Construction Corp. v. Waters,6
decided in 1978, the Court stated that "[i]t is clear beyond cavil that the
obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each
applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the
applicant's race are already proportionately represented in the work
force."7

* Legal Director, American Jewish Committee. B.S. 1943, College of the City of New
York; LL.B. 1950, Columbia Law School.
1. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2. Id. at 431. Burger, C.J., announced the majority opinion in which all the other
Justices joined with the exception of Brennan, J., who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. Id. at 425.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
4. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 ("If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.").
5. Id. at 432 ("Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.").

6. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
7. Id. at 579 (emphasis in original). The Court decided this case seven to two with
Rehnquist, J., delivering the majority opinion in which Burger, C.J., Stewart, White,
Blackmun, Stevens and Powell, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., dissented and was joined by
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Yet, just one year later, in United Steelworkers of America, AFLCIO v. Weber,8 the Court ruled that it is lawful, under title VII, for a
private employer (Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Company in Louisiana)
to voluntarily establish quotas or preferences for black workers in order to
eliminate racial imbalance in traditionally white-only job categories,
provided that these quotas do not "unnecessarily trammel" the interests of
white employees.' And, in 1980, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,0 the Court
upheld a 10% minority set-aside in a federal public works law enacted by
Congress.1 On the other hand, in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts,"2 decided in 1984, the Court held that title VII bars a court from
ordering an employer to lay off employees with greater seniority in favor
of those with lesser seniority,
in order to preserve a certain percentage of
3
blacks in the work force.1
In 1986, in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 4 where there
existed egregious union discrimination for many years, coupled with
defiance of numerous injunctions to cease discrimination,15 the Court
approved a lower court order that imposed on the union a race-conscious
numerical remedy; a goal of 29% black and Hispanic membership. 6 The
following year, in United States v. Paradise,7 the Court upheld a
Brennan, J. Id, at 568.
8. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
9. Id. at 208.
10. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
11. Id. at 492. The Court decided this case five to three with Burger, C.J., announcing
the plurality opinion in which White and Powell, JJ., joined. Powell, J., also filed a
concurring opinion. Marshall, J., filed a concurring opinion which was joined by Brennan
and Blackmun, J1. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Rehnquist,
J., Stevens, J., filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 452.
12. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
13. Id. at 575. The Court decided this case six to three. White, J., delivered the
majority opinion in which Burger, C.J., and Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, J., joined.
O'Connor and Stevens, JJ., filed concurring opinions. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting
opinion in which Brennan and Marshall, 31., joined. Id. at 563.
14. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
15. Id. at 433.
16. Id. at 440-41. This case was narrowly decided five to four. Brennan, J.,
announced the Court's judgment and wrote an opinion in which Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell, Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., joined in part. Powell, J., also filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in judgment. O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Rehnquist, J., filed a
dissenting opinion as well, which Burger, C.J., joined. Id. at 424.
17. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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promotion quota imposed by a lower court after a finding of persistent
discrimination against blacks by the state of Alabama in hiring and
promoting highway patrol officers.' 8 The plan required the state to
promote one black trooper for each white from a pool of qualified
candidates, even if the whites scored higher on tests. 19 Also in 1987, in
Johnson v. TransportationAgency, Santa Clara County, California,' the
Court rejected a challenge by a white male to a voluntary affirmative
action plan implemented by a public agency to redress underrepresentation
of women and minorities in skilled job classifications."' This plan gave a
road dispatcher job to a white woman who had scored slightly less than the
man on an oral examination."
These are a few of the many possible illustrations of how the
Supreme Court has been divided in affirmative action cases, depending on
the facts of the cases and the perceptions at the time of the Justices who
heard them.2' It should be stressed that employment discrimination cases
are complicated ones and their facts differ widely. The law regarding these
cases is by no means crystal clear. Further, the Justices have always been
18. Id. at 185-86. This case was also a narrow five to four decision. Brennan, J.,
announced the Court's decision and wrote an opinion in which Marshall, Blackmun and
Powell, JJ., joined. Powell and Stevens, JJ. filed concurring opinions. O'Connor and
White, JJ., filed dissenting opinions; Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., joined Justice
O'Connor's dissent. Id. at 152.
19. Id. at 154-57.
20. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
21. Id. This case was decided six to three with Brennan, J., writing the majority
opinion in which Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stevens and
O'Connor, JJ., filed concurring opinions. Scalia and White, JJ., wrote dissenting opinions
with Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J., joining Justice Scalia's dissent in part. Id. at 618. The
plan was instated by the agency involved in response to a general directive by the county
to take such initiatives. Id. at 620.
22. Id. at 623-25. The white male began in 1967 as a road clerk and in 1974
unsuccessfully applied for a road dispatcher position. In 1977 his clerical position was
downgraded. Id. at 623.
23. See also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (§ 1981 of
the Civil Rights Act prohibits racial discrimination in connection with making and enforcing
private contracts and the challenger of an employer's action need only show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he or she is qualified for the position in question, not
that he -or she is more qualified than the person who received the position); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (employer has the burden of showing, by
a preponderance of evidence, that the employer would have made the same decision
regardless of the employee's gender even when a prima facie case of sexual discrimination
exists); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (unions involved had violated
§ 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
deliberately refusing to assert claims of racial discrimination against an employer on behalf
of a union member-employee).
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sharply split and at least some of them have been deeply ambivalent about
the wisdom and proper scope of preferential remedies based on race or sex
that were designed to cure historic discrimination. 2

II.

CITY OF RICHMOND v.

. CROSON Co. 5

In this ruling, handed down on January 23, 1989, the Supreme
Court invalidated a Richmond law that channeled 30% of public works
funds to minority-owned construction companies.' In so doing, the Court
considered serious constitutional questions about a variety of governmental
contract and hiring programs designed to aid racial minorities.27
In six separate opinions' the Court ruled that the Richmond
ordinance, similar to minority set-aside programs in 36 states and nearly
200 local governments, violated the constitutional right of white contractors
to equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment. 29 The
opinion announcing the decision of the Court, written by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, stated that such programs could be justified only if they
served the "compelling state interest"3 ° of redressing "identified
discrimination,"3 whether by the government itself or by private parties.a2
"Societal" discrimination alone will not suffice to justify affirmative action
24. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25. 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989).
26. Id. at 730.
27. Id. at 718. "[F]irst, were the objectives of the legislation within the power of
Congress? Second, was the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria a permissible means
for Congress to carry out its objectives within the constraints of the Due Process Clause?"
Id. (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980)).
28. The Court reached its decision in a six to three vote. O'Connor, J., delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts 1, III-B, and IV, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and
White, Stevens and Kennedy, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part II, in which
Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-A and V,
in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens and Kennedy, JJ.,
filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Scalia, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Brennan joined. Id. at 712.
29. Id. at 730.
30. Id. at 727 ("We, therefore, hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race.").
31. Id. "[T]here is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or
'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics." Id. at 721.
32. Id. at 724.
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programs.33
Justice O'Connor held that all racial quotas need to be justified by
more than the general goal of attempting to remedy past discrimination3
She also stated that the statistical disparities in Croson fell far short of
proving that specific acts of discrimination had occurred.a In her words,
"an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular
industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota."' Yet, in the
five years before the set-aside ordinance took effect, fewer than 1% of
Richmond's construction contracts went to minority businesses. 37 After
that, it rose to the mandated 30%.' Then, in 1987 when a lower court
invalidated the set-aside, contracts awarded to blacks fell to 2%."
In distinguishing the Court's decision in the earlier case of Fullilove
v. Kutznick, ° Justice O'Connor noted in the Croson case that the actions
by Congress to redress racial discrimination rested on a solid constitutional
base which is not available to states and localities.4' Section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment gave Congress alone4 broad discretion to decide
what is necessary to promote racial equality.
Justice O'Connor found not a shred of evidence of past
discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or Aleut
persons in any part of Richmond's construction industry. 4 Hence, she
declared that Richmond's random inclusion of those minority groups
strongly impugns the city's claim of remedial motivation." Moreover, in
her view, the plan was not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior
discrimination because it entitled racial minority entrepreneurs from
anywhere in the country to an absolute preference over other citizens,

33. Id. at 725.
34. Id. at 723-24.
35. Id. at 725.
36. Id. at 724.
37. Id. at 714.
38. Id.
39. Williams, DrawingNew Battle Lines in the Civil Rights Fight, Wash. Post, Feb.
19, 1989, at D2, col. 2.
40.
41.
42.
43.

448 U.S. 448 (1980). See also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.

Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 727-28.

44. Id. at 728. Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]he dream of a Nation of equal citizens
in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost

in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past
wrongs." Id. at 727.
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based solely on their race.4"
Justice O'Connor concluded that if the city could identify past
discrimination in the local construction industry with the particularity
required by the equal protection clause, the city would have the power to
adopt race-based legislation designed to eradicate the effects of that
discrimination.4 She also stated that "where special qualifications [for
employment] are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of
demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities
qualified to undertake the particular task."4 7 In light of this rationale, the
most pressing question would seem to be the nature and content of the
evidence a local government would have to amass to meet the Court's
stringent criteria.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a scathing dissent, joined by
Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Harry A. Blackmun, which stated:
Cynical of one municipality's attempt to redress the
effects of past racial discrimination in a particular
industry, the majority launches a grapeshot attack on raceconscious remedies in general. The majority's unnecessary
pronouncements will inevitably discourage or prevent
governmental entities, particularly States and localities,
from acting to rectify the scourge of past discrimination.
This is the harsh reality of the majority's decision, but it
is not the Constitution's command.'
Although there is language in the majority and concurring opinions
that understandably is disquieting to supporters of far-reaching affirmative
action, the Supreme Court certainly did not invalidate all governmentsponsored affirmative action programs. Nor did the Justices completely
bar minority set-asides; the kind of affirmative action that was directly at
issue in this case. The Court did say, however, that all racial classifications
are equally suspect and will be subjected to "strict scrutiny. "" Thus, any

45. Id.
46. Id. at 726-27. Justice O'Connor stated that "[w]hile the States and their
subdivisions may take remedial action when they possess evidence that their own spending
practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination, they must identify that
discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may use race-conscious
relief." Id. at 727.
47. Id. at 725 (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
(1977); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 651-52
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
48. Id. at 740 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 721.
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law that gives members of one race a preference must be tailored as
narrowly as possible to meet the "compelling state interest" of curing
identified discrimination in order to survive a constitutional challenge. 50
The problem, however, is that the thrust of the Croson decision, and at
least some of the language of the majority and concurring opinions, may
well have a detrimental effect on affirmative action programs in general.

III.

PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS5'

On May 1, 1989, the Supreme Court, in a technical and
complicated case of alleged intentional discrimination, ruled that an
employer has the burden of proving that its refusal to hire or promote a
person is based on non-discriminatory grounds.5 2 Price Waterhouse
claimed that a female employee who was refused partnership in the
accounting firm had the burden of proving that the employer's
discriminatory practices cost her that position, rather than legitimate prior
judgments proving her capabilities.53
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan rejecting the
accounting firm's argument, held that evidence that Ms. Hopkins was
evaluated by her male supervisors on the basis of stereotyped views of
appropriate female appearance and behavior can establish the existence of
unlawful sex-discrimination.54 Once the plaintiff proved that her gender
played a part in the employment decision, the defendant may avoid liability
by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made
the same decision even if it had not taken plaintiffs gender into
account. 5
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled that
Price Waterhouse was required to submit "clear and convincing" proof that
its reasons for denying a partnership to Ms. Hopkins were nondiscriminatory. 56 However, the Supreme Court lowered the firm's burden
of proof by ruling that it should have been held to the lesser standard of
"a preponderance of the evidence" in supporting its claim that it had

50. Id.
51. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).

52. Id. at 1790

(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (6-3 decision).

53. See id. at 1784.
54. Id. at 1791. One partner described her as "macho," another advised her to take
"a course at charm school," several criticized her use of profanity. Id. at 1782.
55. Id. at 1791-92.
56. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (relying on
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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legitimate reasons to deny her a partnership.57 The case was remanded
to the lower court for reconsideration under the less rigorous standard. 58
It should be stressed that this case involves an allegation of
intentional discrimination, rather than a case of disparate treatment or
impact without direct evidence of the intent to discriminate.59 The nature
of the case is important because it relates to the critical question of who
has the burden of proof. In this case there was evidence that the
employer's denial of a partnership to the female plaintiff may have been
based on both legitimate and discriminatory reasons.' In such a "mixed
motive" case, the burden of proof may be almost insurmountable to a
plaintiff who has some evidence of discrimination, but who lacks sufficient
information to show that discrimination was the crucial factor. Hence, the
Court's ruling is significant in that an employer now has the burden of
proving that its refusal to promote was based on legitimate reasons rather
than any discriminatory reasons. The Court, therefore, made it easier for
a plaintiff to prevail upon a charge of intentional discrimination or
disparate treatment in employment based upon sex, race or age.
There was no single majority opinion in the case. Justice
Brennan's opinion, representing a plurality, was joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.6 Justice White wrote a separate
concurring opinion,6' as did Justice O'Connor.'
The chief difference
between these concurring opinions, and that of Justice Brennan's plurality,
was that the concurring Justices would require a plaintiff to initially show
that discrimination was at least a "substantial" factor in the employer's
decision adverse to the plaintiff." The employer would then have to
prove that the adverse decision would have been made anyway.6 In
contrast, Justice Brennan's opinion requires the plaintiff to initially show
only that discrimination was a "motivating" factor in the adverse
decision."
57. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1792 (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 1793.
59. Id. at 1788. For examples of disparate impact cases, see Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a classic statement of the Court's disparate treatment
analysis, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
60. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791-92 (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion).
61. Id. at 1781.
62. Id. at 1795 (White, J.,
concurring).
63. Id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1795 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
65. Id. at 1795 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
66. Id. at 1787 (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion).

Symp. 1990]

1988-89 TERM DECISIONS

Justice Kennedy dissented, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. 67 In the view of these Justices, the plaintiff
had failed to meet the requisite standard of proof of discrimination.6
The dissenters also contended that the Court's approach to the complex
rules for judging employment discrimination cases is "certain to result in
confusion."69 Justice Kennedy stated:
The ultimate question in every individual
disparate treatment case is whether discrimination caused
the particular decision at issue.
.. . That decision was for the finder of fact,
however, and the District Court made plain that sex
discrimination was not a but-for cause of the decision to
place Hopkins' partnership candidacy on hold.
Hopkins thus failed to meet the requisite
standard of proof after a full trial.70
71
WARDS COVE PACKiNG CO. v. ATONIO

IV.

The issue considered by the Supreme Court is whether employers
who are sued under title VII have the burden of justifying, on grounds of
"business necessity," practices that are shown to have a discriminatory
impact on minorities or women. 72 On June 5, 1989, the Supreme Court
narrowly said "no."73 The Court ruled that when a title VII plaintiff uses
statistics to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, the
employer must provide evidence only of a legitimate reason for the
challenged practice. 74 Further, the Court held that the burden of proving
that such a practice is not a form of unlawful discrimination does not shift
to the employer.7" Justice White, who delivered the opinion of the Court,
declared that "the plaintiff bears the burden of disproving an employer's
assertion that the adverse employment action or practice was based solely
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1814.
Id. at 1806.
Id. at 1813-14.
109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
Id. at 2119.
This case was decided five to four. Id. at 2118.
Id. at 2125-26.
Id. at 2126.
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on a legitimate neutral consideration."76
The decision also limited the type of statistical evidence that
minorities can use to prove discrimination. 77 In this regard, Justice White
stated that a lack of minority group members in skilled jobs is not valid
evidence if that statistic merely reflects "a dearth of qualified non-white
applicants (for reasons that are not [an employer's] fault) .... "7
The case arose when nonwhite workers at the company's Alaskan
salmon canneries charged that the company's hiring and promotion
practices caused racial stratification in the workforce. 79 Eskimo and
Filipino workers on the factory lines allegedly were denied access to the
better-paid skilled jobs, which were filled predominantly by white
workers.' The Court ruled that a comparison of the percentage of
nonwhite cannery workers with the percentage of nonwhite non-cannery
workers does not in itself establish a prima facie "disparate impact" case.8'
Rather, said the Court, "[t]he proper comparison [is] between the racial
composition of [the jobs in question] and the racial composition of the
qualified ... population in the relevant labor market."82 A mere showing3

that nonwhites are underrepresented in the skilled jobs will not suffice.8
The Court stated that the lower courts must require proof that the
statistical disparity complained of is the result of the employment practices
that are being attacked, specifically showing that each challenged practice
has a significant "disparate impact" on employment opportunities for
nonwhites.8s
Justice White stated that the plaintiffs must show not only that
specific policies created the disparities, but that the employer had no
legitimate business justification for the practices in question.85 In his
view, this "burden of persuasion" fell naturally on title VII plaintiffs, rather
than on the employer, because it is the plaintiffs who must prove that they
76. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-58
(1981)).
77. Id. at 2121-23.
78. Id. at 2122 (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 2119-20.
80. Id. at 2119.
81. Id. at 2123.
82. Id. at 2121 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
(1977)).
83. Id. at 2122.
84. Id. at 2125.
85. Id. at 2126. Justice White's opinion was joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor,
Scalia and Kennedy, JJ. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, as did Blackmun, I.
Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined both dissenting opinions. Id. at 2118.
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were discriminated against." The Court remanded the case to the lower
court with instructions to permit the plaintiffs to show, on some other
basis, that the underrepresentation of minority groups in the skilled jobs
violated title VII.' In sum, the Court made it significantly easier for
employers to defend hiring and promotion practices that may have a
discriminatory impact on members of racial minorities and women.
The dissenters accused the Court of rejecting its own previous
rulings in title VII cases ' and of turning its back on the nation's long
history of racial discrimination.89 In the words of Justice Blackmun's brief
dissent: "One wonders whether the majority still believes that race
discrimination -- or, more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites
-- is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was."' In
Justice Steven's lengthy dissent, he stated:
Fully 18 years ago, this Court unanimously held
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
employment practices that have discriminatory effects as
well as those that are intended to discriminate.
Decisions of this Court and other federal courts
repeatedly have recognized that while the employer's
burden in a disparate treatment case is simply one of
coming forward with evidence of legitimate business
purpose, its burden in a disparate impact case is proof of
an affirmative defense of business necessity.9'
Although this decision does not explicitly overrule the Court's
decision in Griggs, implicitly at least, it comes very close to having done so,
and thus represents a measurable setback to the cause of equal
employment opportunity for racial minorities and women.'
86. Id. at 2126.
87. Id. at 2126-27.
88. Id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined in both dissenting opinions. Id. at 2118.
89. Id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id. (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 2127-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (citing in part Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
92. While this decision appears at first glance to contradict the Court's ruling in Price
Waterhouse, where the Court ruled that the employer has the burden of proving that a
refusal to promote is based on nondiscriminatory grounds, the two cases are reconcilable.
Unlike Wards Cove, the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse charged intentional discrimination

20
V.
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The issue in this case was whether white men who were not
involved in litigation leading to a court-approved affirmative action plan,
which gave preferences to minorities or women, could subsequently
challenge such a plan as violating title VII. 9 The Supreme Court held
that they could do so and that such suits may be filed even years after the
affirmative action plan took effect. 95 Interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court: "A voluntary
settlement in the form of a consent decree between one group of
employees and their employer cannot possibly 'settle,' voluntarily or
otherwise, the conflicting claims of another group of employees who do
not join in the agreement. ""'
This decision permitted white firefighters in Birmingham, Alabama,
to attack an eight-year old, court-approved settlement which was intended
to increase the number of blacks hired and promoted by the fire
department.97
Consent decrees that have settled many racial
discrimination suits, and which have long been regarded as immune to
subsequent legal challenge by outside parties, may now be only the opening
round in a new phase of ongoing litigation. 9 The Court thus rejected a
doctrine known as "impermissible collateral attack," which would protect
parties to a consent decree from charges of discrimination by nonparties
based on actions mandated by the decree." The ruling, because it
involves the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, also
applies to all types of decrees including those that resolve sex
in a case where the evidence as to the employer's motivation was ambiguous. Compare
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (discriminatory practices as a
result of a "business necessity" does not shift the burden of proof to the employer) with
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (prima facie showing of intentional
discrimination shifts the burden of proof to the employer).
93. 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989).
94. Id. at 2181.
95. Id. at 2180-82. Rehnquist, C.J., wrote the five to four majority opinion which was
joined by White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, JJ. Stevens, J., dissented and was joined
by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ. Id. at 2182.
96. Id. at 2188.
97. Id. at 2182-83.
98. See id. at 2184. The Court decided that the strong public policy in favor of
voluntary affirmative action plans "must yield to the policy against requiring third parties
to submit to bargains in which their interests were either ignored or sacrificed." Id.
(quoting In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492,
1498 (1987)).
99. Id. at 2185.
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discrimination cases." 0 The Court did not indicate whether any time
limits would be placed on such subsequent actions, which Chief Justice
Rehnquist characterized as "reverse discrimination" suits.'0 '
In his opinion, the Chief Justice acknowledged the prevailing
judicial view that if individuals choose not to intervene in a suit that might
ultimately affect them, "they.should not be permitted to later litigate the
issues in a new action."0" The Chief Justice stated that "[t]he position
has sufficient appeal to have commanded the approval of the great
majority of the federal courts of appeals, but we agree with the contrary
view expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in this
case."10 3 In the majority's view, "[a] judgment or decree among parties
to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the
Based on this broad
rights of strangers to those proceedings.""°
not merely courtsubsequent
dispute
opens
to
the
decision
language,
approved settlements but also judgments resulting from full trials.
The Birmingham firefighters' case began in the early 1970's when
the local chapter of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.,
supported by the United States government, sued the city of Birmingham
in Jefferson County, Alabama, claiming racially discriminatory hiring and
promotion practices by the fire department.' 5 After several years of
litigation a settlement was reached, but the union that represented the
department's almost completely white workforce objected to it.10 6 The
district court approved the settlement and entered a consent decree under
which blacks and whites would be hired and promoted in equal numbers
until the number of black firefighters approximated the proportion of
blacks in the civilian labor force.0 7 Several months later a group of
white firefighters sued the city, arguing that the consent decree illegally
discriminated against them.10 8 The district court dismissed this suit on
the ground that the city could not be guilty of discrimination if it was
100. Id. The Court stated its analysis in general and broadly applicable terms. "[A]
party seeking a judgment binding on another cannot obligate that person to intervene; he
must be joined." Id. (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
110 (1969)).
101. See id. at 2187.
102. Id. at 2185 (the Chief Justice's opinion was joined by White, O'Connor, Scalia
and Kennedy, JJ.).
103. Id. (footnote omitted).
104. Id. at 2184 (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 2183.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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complying with the mandate of a consent decree." ° In 1987, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal
and reinstated the white firefighters' discrimination suit.110 The city,
along with a group of black firefighters, then appealed to the Supreme
Court."
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, warning that the decision
would serve to discourage voluntary settlements of discrimination
complaints.'
Justice Stevens stated:
In a case such as this.., in which there has been
no showing that the decree was collusive, fraudulent,
transparently invalid, or entered without jurisdiction, it
would be "unconscionable" to conclude that obedience to
an order remedying a Title VII violation could subject a
defendant to additional liability.... Any other conclusion
would subject large employers who seek to comply with
the law by remedying past discrimination to a neverending stream of litigation and potential liability. It is
unfathomable that either Title VII or the Equal
Protection Clause demands such a counter-productive
result."'
This decision is most unsettling. By enabling interested parties,
such as white males, to reopen discrimination cases long believed to have
been closed due to court-approved consent decrees, it may have the effect
of unraveling significant gains in employment by racial minorities and
women that had been thought secure.
VI.

LORANCE v. AT & T TECHNOLOGIES, INC."4'

Before 1979, collective-bargaining agreements between AT & T
Technologies, Inc., and Local 1942, International Brotherhood of Electrical
109. Id. at 2183-84.
110. See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492
(11th Cir. 1987). The court of appeals stated that "[b]ecause ... [the Wilks respondents]
were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees,... their independent claims of
unlawful discrimination are not precluded.' Id. at 1498.
111. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 492, cert. granted, Martin v. Wilks, 487 U.S. 1204
(1988).
112. Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2188 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2199-200.
114. 109 S.Ct. 2261 (1989).
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Workers, AFL-CIO, had determined a worker's seniority on the basis of
years of plantwide service, and such seniority was transferable upon
promotion to a more skilled tester position."' A new agreement executed
by AT & T in 1979 changed this by making seniority in tester jobs
dependent upon the amount of time spent as a tester."' During an
economic downturn in 1982, three women employees who were promoted
to tester positions between 1978 and 1980 received demotions that would
not have occurred had the former seniority system remained in place. 7
The women filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission in 1983 and, after receiving right-to-sue letters, filed an action
in United States district court."
They alleged that the newly adopted
seniority system, which protected incumbent and predominately male
testers from female employees who had greater plantwide seniority,
violated their rights under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11
The district court rejected their claims on the ground that they had not
been filed within the required period "after the alleged unlawful
employment practice121occurred."1" The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed that ruling.
On June 12, 1989, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals' judgment, thereby imposing stringent time limitations on
the filing of law suits challenging allegedly discriminatory seniority
systems.'2 In the opinion, Justice Scalia ruled that such challenges must
be brought within 300 days of the adoption of the seniority system that is

115. Id. at 2263.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2264.

118. Id. (the action was filed in 1983 in the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois).
119. Id. (women were becoming testers in increasing numbers). See also 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
120. Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2264. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
a circuit conflict on when the limitations period begins to run. Lorance v. AT & T
Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988) (mem.). For an example of the circuit court
conflict, compare Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 827 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1987)
(statute of limitations begins to run at the time an employee becomes subject to a system
that that employee knew, or should have known, was discriminatory) with Cook v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 771 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1985) (statute of limitations begins to run upon
the employer's last discriminatory act), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 1109 (1986).
121. Lorance,827 F.2d at 167.
122. Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2269. Scalia, J., delivered the five to three opinion of the
Court in which Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Stevens and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J.,
filed a concurring opinion. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Brennan and
Blackmun, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., took no part in the decision. Id. at 2263.
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alleged to be discriminatory."
In the opinion for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that the
Court's precedents concerning discriminatory seniority systems made it
clear that it is the adoption of the system, and not its consequences, that
is the "discriminatory act" under title VII.TM In his words by "allowing a
facially neutral system to be challenged, and entitlements under it to be
altered, many years after its adoption would disrupt" the legitimate
interests of other employees who relied on the changes."2
In a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
Justice Marshall stated that "[n]othing in the text of Title VII compels this
result." 26 He went on to state:
The majority today continues the process of
immunizing seniority systems from the requirements of
Title VII. In addition to the other hurdles previously put
in place by the Court, employees must now anticipate, and
initiate suit to prevent, future adverse applications of a
seniority system, no matter how speculative or unlikely
these applications may be."
In the view of the dissenting Justices, Congress, in enacting title
VII, never intended to confer "absolute immunity on discriminatorily
adopted seniority systems that survive their first 300 days."' 28 They
accused the majority of a "severe interpretation" of the law, which in effect
is not fair to an employee who subsequently challenges a system which, at
the time of its adoption, the employee could not reasonably have expected
to be detrimental to her or him."
VII.

PATTERSON v. MCLEAN CREDIT UNION'

The Supreme Court, in an unusual action, decided to reconsider
the rights of minorities to sue private parties for racial discrimination
123. Id. at 2268-69. The Court pointed out that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires title
VII suits to be filed within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. Id. at 2264 n.2 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964)).
124. Id. at 2269.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2270 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2273.
128. Id. at 2270 (footnote omitted).
129. Id.
130. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
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under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.131 Five Justices, over strenuous
dissents by the other four, agreed to consider overruling the Court's
prior decision of Runyon v. McCray," which had expanded minorities'
rights. The Court took this action on its own initiative; the parties in
Patterson had not sought it.1" The Court's action sent shock waves
through the civil rights community.
The majority ordered the lawyers in Patterson, a case the Court
had already heard, to present new arguments on whether to overturn the
earlier ruling. 13 The issue was whether the Court had erred in its ruling
in Runyon that the post-Civil War statute, which guaranteed the rights of
the newly freed slaves, was intended to bar racial discrimination by private
schools, employers and other parties in deciding with whom they will
contract or do business.13 The statute provides, in pertinent part, that
all persons shall have the same right "to make and enforce contracts...
as is enjoyed by white citizens ...
7
Until the 1960's, this statute was used to attack state and local
laws that interfered with the business and contractual rights of
minorities."s Later, in the 1960's and 1970's, civil rights lawyers began
using it successfully to attack private discrimination, including private
131. Id. at 2369. See also Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14
Stat. 27 (reenacted as amended pursuant to the ratification of the fourteenth amendment
at Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 stat 140 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
132. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Rehnquist, C.J., and
White, O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined and
in which Stevens, J., joined in part. Stevens, J., also filed an opinion concurring and
dissenting in part. Id. at 2368.
133. 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (where the Court held seven to two that § 1981 prohibits
private schools from excluding children who are qualified for admission, solely on the basis

of race).
134. Patterson,109 S. Ct. at 2369. After oral argument on certain issues the Court
requested the parties to brief and argue an additional question: "Whether or not the
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCray should
be reconsidered." Id. (citations omitted) (the American Jewish Committee joined in an
amicus brief with many other civil rights groups urging the Court not to overrule Runyon).
135. Id.

136. Id. at 2370.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
138. See, e.g., Johnson v. Yeilding, 165 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Ala. 1958) (the Personnel

Board of Jefferson County, Alabama was challenged for failure to allow minorities to take
the examination for the position of police patrolman); Browder v. City of Montgomery,
Ala., 146 F. Supp. 127 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (action to restrain city from interfering with the
operation of an automobile pool by minorities).
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employment discrimination, leading to Runyon.'39
The immediate ruling in Runyon was that black people could sue
private schools for denying them admission on racial grounds.'" The
Court's broad reasoning also applied generally in allowing suits by
minorities for racial discrimination in private transactions.14 One major
effect was to give victims of job discrimination broader protections and
more potent remedies than are provided by the Civil Rights Act of
1964.' Originally, in Patterson, the Court agreed simply to consider the
question of whether a black woman teller at a North Carolina credit union,
who said she was harassed and discriminated against by her employer on
account of her race, could sue her employer for damages under § 1981.143
On June 15, 1989, the Supreme Court unanimously decided not to
overrule Runyon.' 4 Simultaneously, however, the high Court ruled that
§ 1981 cannot serve as the basis for a law suit alleging racial harassment
in the work place. 145 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, stated that
while § 1981 did prohibit discrimination at the initial hiring stage, it did
not prohibit discriminatory treatment on the job.1" In the majority's
view, Congress never intended that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 should go
any further. 147 Justice Kennedy wrote that "the right to make contracts
does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the
employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach
of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working
conditions."'"
Having held as he did, Justice Kennedy nonetheless declared that
"[t]he law now reflects society's consensus that discrimination based on the
color of one's skin is a profound wrong of tragic dimension."149 He
stated, moreover, that neither the Court's words nor its decisions "should
be interpreted as signaling one inch of retreat from Congress' policy to
139.
140.
141.
142.

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
Id. at 172.
Id. at 168-72.
Id. at 184-85 (e.g., the ability to sue for punitive damages). See also 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(g) (1988).
143. Patterson,109 S. Ct. at 2369.
144. Id.
145. Id. (5-4 decision).
146. Id. at 2372-73 (Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
White, O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.).
147. Id. at 2372.

148. Id. at 2373.
149. Id. at 2379.
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forbid discrimination in the private, as well as the public, sphere."" °
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, charged that "[w]hat the Court
declines to snatch away with one hand, it takes with the other.""5 He
went on to accuse the majority of giving "this landmark civil rights statute
a needlessly cramped interpretation."152 Moreover, Justice Brennan
stated that "[w]hen it comes to deciding whether a civil rights statute
should be construed to further our Nation's commitment to the eradication
of racial discrimination, the Court adopts a formalistic method of
interpretation antithetical to Congress' vision of a society in which
contractual opportunities are equal."
After observing that "[s]ome Members of this Court believe that
Runyon was decided incorrectly," 54 Justice Kennedy stated that there was
no need for the Court to decide whether the Runyon decision was either
right or wrong, because it is not "inconsistent with the prevailing sense of
justice in this country."' 55 Justice Brennan, however, insisted that the
Runyon decision was correct at the time it was decided. 6
Justice Kennedy did not say what had motivated the Court to order
reargument in this case. He did, however, list reasons why the Court had
previously overturned precedents and then indicated why these did not
apply to the Runyon decision.'57 Justice Kennedy stated that the "primary
reason" for the Court to overrule precedents interpreting federal statutes
was an "intervening development," either in judicial doctrine or through an
act of Congress that has "removed or weakened the conceptual
underpinnings from the prior decision."158 In his opinion he stated that
no intervening developments had occurred with respect to Runyon and that
Runyon was neither "unworkable [nor] confusing."59 Justice Kennedy
was careful to distinguish between cases interpreting federal law and those
interpreting constitutional provisions, noting that considerations of stare
decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation because
150. Id.
151. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., and in part,
Stevens, J.).

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2370 (majority opinion).
155. Id. at 2371. Justice Kennedy found that Runyon is consistent with society's
commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or the color of
his or her skin. Id.
156. Id. at 2380 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
157. Id. at 2370-71 (majority opinion).
158. Id. at 2370.
159. Id. at 2371.
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Congress is free to interpret the statute itself if the Court has
misinterpreted a congressional action. 16 By contrast, since the Court is
the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, 61 only the Court itself,
absent a constitutional amendment, can correct an interpretation it later
comes to view as erroneous.
Whatever one's view may be as to the correct interpretation of §
1981, there can be little doubt that the Court's restrictive interpretation
severely weakens it as a weapon against discrimination in employment."
VIII.

JETT v. DALLAS INDEPENDENTSCHOOL DISTRICT

3

This case concerns an interpretation of the same statute that was
at issue in Patterson.' On June 22, 1989, the Supreme Court ruled five
to four that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 cannot be used to bring damage suits against
state or local governments for acts of racial discrimination.' 5 In an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, containing a lengthy exposition of the
legislative histories of the civil rights laws of 1866 and 1871, the Court
ruled that Congress had intended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide the exclusive
remedy for bringing such damage suits.' Section 1983 gives individuals
the right to challenge official actions that allegedly deprive them of
constitutional or federal statutory rights." 7 In the words of Justice
O'Connor: "We think the history of the 1866 Act and the 1871 Act...
indicates that Congress intended that the explicit remedial provisions of
§ 1983 be controlling in the context of damages actions brought against
state actors alleging violation of the rights declared in § 1981.""
Significantly this ruling makes it more difficult for a plaintiff to
prevail in such a suit because the plaintiff must prove that the
discrimination in question was not a random act of an individual public
employee, but rather resulted from an official "custom or policy.""
Because most governmental entities today have official policies against
racial discrimination, it will be difficult for plaintiffs to sustain this burden
160. Id. at 2370.
161.
province
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) ('It is emphatically the
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.').
See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
See supra notes 131-65 and accompanying text.
Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2704. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2704. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

167. Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2720. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
168. Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2720.
169. Id. at 2722.
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of proof.' °
Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Scalia and Kennedy, the same five justices who
interpreted § 1981 narrowly in Patterson.' Justice Brennan, in his
dissent, lamented that the underlying issue of whether § 1981 could be used
at all in suits against governmental agencies was brought to the Court
belatedly and was not fully briefed.'
Because I would conclude that § 1981 itself
affords a cause of action in damages on the basis of
governmental conduct violating its terms, and because I
would conclude that such an action may be predicated on
a theory of respondeat superior, I dissent.
...During the period when § 1 of the 1866 Act
was enacted, and for over 100 years thereafter, the federal
courts routinely concluded that a statute setting forth
substantive rights without specifying a remedy contained
an implied cause of action for damages incurred in
violation of the statute's termsY 3
Until this ruling, lower federal courts had interpreted § 1981 to
permit damage suits against state and local governments.' 4 Under these
decisions, governmental bodies were held responsible for discriminatory
acts of their employees, under a theory of "vicarious liability," without any
need to show that the employee was carrying out an official policy. 75
Consequently, § 1981, which guarantees to all persons the right to "make
and enforce contracts" and the right to "full and equal benefit of all laws,"
was frequently invoked by civil rights plaintiffs, when suing government

170. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.6 (1989) (extending the goal of equal opportunity
in employment to the Department of Defense).
171. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). See also supra
notes 131-65 and accompanying text.
172. Jeft, 109 S. Ct. at 2724-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan claimed that
the Court improperly reviewed the question of whether one may bring a suit for damages
under § 1981 itself on the basis of governmental conduct. Id. Justice Brennan also
pointed out that this issue was raised in the respondent's brief but was not raised as an
issue in the appellate court or by the petitioner. Id.
173. Id. at 2725-26 (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 2727-28.
175. Id.
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agencies.1

The case arose when a white high school football coach, Norman
Jett, employed by the Dallas Independent School District, was fired by a
black principal, resulting in a lawsuit charging racial discrimination.'"
In the trial court the coach won a $650,000 award against the school
district on the basis that the district was liable for the action of the
principal. 178 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed the
decision."7 It ruled that the "vicarious liability" interpretation of § 1981
was wrong and that the official "policy or custom" approach of § 1983
should apply.' Upon appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part the
Fifth Circuit's decision, and held that § 1983 was the only law under which
such a suit for damages can be brought.' While the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which broadly bars discrimination in employment, can also be used
to sue government employers, it permits plaintiffs to sue only for backpay
and not for other types of damages.'8
IX.

WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

What comes through with great force from these recent civil rights
decisions is that where the language of a law and/or its legislative history
is not clear, where judicial precedents provided by earlier cases are not
definitive, where the issue is one of two rights in conflict both of which
make a plausible claim for a favorable ruling in terms of justice, the
Supreme Court Justices are likely to vote in accord with their underlying
political and social philosophies. In this regard, the so-called "conservativeliberal" split in this Court is nothing new -- historically, it has always been
so. Only the issues are different.
There can be no serious question that on civil rights issues, at
least, the Supreme Court pendulum has swung to the "right." There is now
176. See, e.g., Walls v. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 542 F. Supp. 281 (N.D.
Miss. 1982).
177. Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2704.
178. Id. at 2708.
179. Id. at 2708-09.
180. Id. at 2709 (relying on Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 762 (5th
Cir. 1986)).
181. Id. at 2704.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). See also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 485 U.S.
219 (1982) (the Court restated the general goal of title VII remedies to make injured
claimants whole); Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1985).
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Its recent watershed
in place a solid "conservative" majority of five.'
decisions, taken together, are likely to make discrimination suits more
difficult to bring, more difficult to win and more vulnerable to challenge
if, in fact, they are won.' They will assuredly have a chilling effect on
the aspirations of racial minorities and women.
The chief reason for this shift to the "right" is the new complexion
of the bench resulting from former President Reagan's three appointments.
In 1981, Justice O'Connor was appointed to replace retiring Justice
While Justice Stewart was considered to be moderately
Stewart."
conservative, on balance he was less "conservative" than Justice O'Connor
has proved to be on civil rights issues. Justice Stewart, for example, voted
with the majority in 1979 in the pro-affirmative action decision in United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Weber.'
More recently, Justice Scalia, who took the seat vacated by Justice
Rehnquist upon the accession of the latter to the post of Chief Justice
when former Chief Justice Burger retired, has proved to be more
"conservative" on civil rights issues than the Justice he replaced.'
Former Chief Justice Burger, for example, while certainly not the most
liberal Justice of the Court, wrote the pro-affirmative action majority
183. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (the
conservative majority consisting of Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy and White,
JJ.).
184. See, e.g., Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989)
(upholding the imposition of a stringent time limitation on civil rights claims); Martin v.
Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (a challenge to a previously approved eight year old court
settlement of an employment discrimination claim was allowed); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (employer's burden of proof is lowered to the lesser
preponderance of the evidence standard when demonstrating that its reasons for the
challenged action are legitimate).
185. Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor to be an Associate Justice, 17
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 729 (July 7, 1981). Justice O'Connor's nomination was
confirmed by the Senate on Sept. 21, 1981. Greenhouse, Senate Confirms Judge
O'Connor; She will Join High CourtFriday, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
Justice O'Connor then took her seat on the High Court on Sept. 25, 1981, and is the first
woman to sit upon the Court in its history. Greenhouse, Justice O'Connor Seated on
Nation's Highest Court, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1981, at A8, col. 1.
186. 443 U.S. 193, 195 (1979). Weber involved a challenge to a private employer's
affirmative action program brought by white employees passed over for promotions in
favor of black workers. Id. at 199. The Court upheld the program stating that "[t]he very
statutory words ... cannot be interpreted as an absolute prohibition against all private,
voluntary race conscious efforts to abolish... racial segregation. .. ." Id. at 204.
187. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See supra notes 10-11 and
accompanying text.

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. Via

opinion in Fulilove v. Klutznick in 1980 .1' Justice Scalia, like Justice
O'Connor, has voted on the same side as staunchly "conservative" Chief
Justice Rehnquist in approximately 80% of the cases before the Court. 1'
Based on his recent opinions, Justice Kennedy, who replaced
retiring Justice Powell, is clearly more "conservative" than was his
predecessor.19 Justice Powell tended to adopt a middle ground position
with regard to affirmative action remedies. Although he rejected the quota
remedy, in the 1978 case of Regents of the University of California v.
Justice Powell stressed that the equal protection clause
Bakke,
guarantees protection to all individuals regardless of race, and held also
that race and ethnicity may be taken into account in the admissions
process of the state university because racial and ethnic diversity are valid
educational objectives.1 2 And, in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
InternationalAssociation v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,"
Justice Powell, once again, as he did in Bakke, provided the crucial fifth
vote to make a majority, stating that "the imposition of flexible goals as a
remedy for past discrimination may be permissible under the Constitution
p194

Finally, Justice White, who has served on the bench for twentyseven years, quite simply has changed his mind on civil rights issues."9
While he, too, was part of the pro-affirmative action majority in United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Weber,"' it seems clear from his
recent opinions and votes that he now believes that Weber was wrongly
188. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453.
189. Coyle, Major Liberal Victories Dominate Rehnquist Term, Nat'l LJ., Aug. 17,
1987, at S3, col. 1.
190. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., joined the "conservative majority" consisting of Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, O'Connor and
White, JJ.).

191.
192.
193.
194.

438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 269.
478 U.S. 421 (1986). See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 488-89.

195. For examples of cases which are "pro" civil rights in which White, J., joined the
majority or plurality opinion, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United
Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Furnco Constr. Co. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). For examples of cases which are hostile towards civil rights
in which White, J., joined the majority or plurality, see Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist.,
109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989);
Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct.
2180 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).

196. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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decided."9
Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority in
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,"' decided in 1984, in which
the Court refused to allow layoffs of more senior workers in order to
preserve affirmative action gains.'"
Looking ahead to what may be in store during the years to come,
especially in light of the sudden retirement of Justice Brennan and the
appointment of Justice David Souter, the future of the Court seems
undecided? ° The two remaining most "liberal" Justices, Marshall and
Blackmun, are themselves more than 80 years old and close to retirement.
As lawyers say, res ipsa loquitur -- the thing speaks for itself -- or so it
would appear.
As of this writing, a comprehensive bill has been passed by both
This
houses of Congress entitled the Civil Rights Act of 1990.2'
proposed Act would undo through legislation at least some of the effects
of the Supreme Court's retreat on civil rights?2 However, President
Bush has threatened to veto the bill as written, finding it unacceptable as
197. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
198. 467 U.S. 561 (1984). See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
199. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 575.

200. Greenhouse, Vacancy on the Court; Brennan; Key Liberal, Quits Supreme
Court; Battle For Seat Likely, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1990, at 1, col. 6; Wermiel &

Shribman, Bush's Choice: High Court Nominee is Conservative but Isn't Seen as an
Idealogue, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
201. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
[hereinafter Civil Rights Act of 1990]. It is worthy to note that it took Congress four years
to respond to the Supreme Court's limiting decision of Grove City College v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555 (1984), by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102
Stat. 28 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681) (the Act was passed on March 22,
1988). The Act reverses Grove by applying federal anti-discrimination laws to entire
institutions that accept federal funds, rather than only to the specific programs in such
institutions that are helped by such funds. Id.
202. See Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 201, § 2. The Court's ruling in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), since it was based on constitutional
grounds, is not susceptible to statutory correction. Id. at 730; see supra notes 25-52 and
accompanying text. "Because the City of Richmond has failed to identify the need for
remedial action in the awarding of its ... contracts, its treatment of its citizens on a racial
basis violates the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 730. The Court's ruling
in Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989), was not based on a particular statute but
rather on an interpretation of the procedural rules that govern the federal courts. Id. at
2185. Perhaps the least difficult case to correct is Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109
S. Ct. 2363 (1989), because of a broad political consensus in support of expanding the
scope of § 1981. It remains to be seen how successful this effort will be.
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In the face of a presidential veto, it
a promotion of racial quotas.'
remains to be seen how successful this effort will be.
203. Kenworthy, Rights Bill Passes House, May Be Nullified by Veto, Wash. Post,
Aug. 4, 1990, at Al, col. 1.

